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1 Introduction
Recent studies on the cost of import competition cover a wide spectrum, from economic costs (e.g.,
job destruction and wage decline) to social costs (e.g., health deterioration and increase in crime).
They have documented significant effects of imports in each area, highlighting that the benefit
from expanding trade and accompanying adjustment costs has been differently distributed among
individuals. According to them, strengthening import competition has decreased manufacturing
employment (Autor et al., 2013; Dauth et al., 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2016) and has reduced the
wages of workers who were forced to change their jobs or whose job or task were close substitutes
of imports (Autor et al., 2014; Ebenstein et al., 2014; Hummels et al., 2014). It has also induced
physical and mental illness (Autor et al., 2019; Colantone et al., 2019; Pierce and Schott, 2019) and
crime (Dix-Carneiro et al., 2018; Dell et al., 2019) via unemployment or income loss.1 As import
competition affects many facets of our lives through job change, the estimation of trade impact on
job change is a pivotal element in broader literature about trade effect on our quality of life.
Considering the key role of net job change in the causal relationship from international trade on
welfare, I seek a closer understanding of trade effects on net job change in this study. To achieve
this goal, I rely on three sets of methodologies developed by previous studies. First, I employ the
reduced-form specification of Autor et al. (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) to obtain implied
employment changes induced by trade shocks. On one hand, Autor et al. (2013) successfully
used shift-share instruments, or Bartik instruments, to construct regional trade shock indices in
their cross-region analysis. On the other hand, Acemoglu et al. (2016) conducted cross-industry
analyses with direct and upstream effects of trade shocks to obtain implied employment change.
Though this estimation does not include local effects of employment reallocation and demand
spillovers, the implied job changes due to trade shocks are only slightly smaller than that based on
1Not all social costs of trade arise from unemployment or income loss, of course. For example, there are studies
which explained how trade affected workers’ health from their performance in firms. McManus and Schaur (2016)
proved that Chinese import shocks increased worker injuries, and they interpreted it from firms’ awareness of shut-
down risk. Hummels et al. (2016) showed that the increase in exports by firms raised workers’ injury rates and sickness
rates of female workers.
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their cross-region analysis. These results support the view that both cross-region and cross-industry
analyses are applicable to the study.
Second, instead of using a set of job changes directly as a dependent variable in regression
analyses, I sort job changes into industry- and region-specific factors by applying the methodology
of Amiti and Weinstein (2018) and use them separately as dependent variables. Among four classes
of trade impacts on job changes portrayed by Acemoglu et al. (2016), direct and indirect effects
of trade shocks are regarded as part of the industry factor, and aggregated local reallocation and
demand effects are included in the regional factor. Thus far, the trade impact through the latter
factor has not been directly estimated. Autor et al. (2013) calculated total implied employment
change through the sum of industry and regional factors, and Acemoglu et al. (2016) indirectly
obtained employment change through the regional factor from the difference of cross-region and
cross-industry results. By using industry- and region-specific shocks, two parts of total job changes
obtained from the Amiti–Weinstein decomposition method, separately as dependent variables, the
extent of trade effects on employments in each factor becomes directly testable.
Third, net job change is divided into job creation and job destruction. Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992) produced a seminal work on job creation and destruction, and Davis et al. (1996) framed an
anatomy of job reallocation. These tools are useful to understand the dynamism of job churning.
By dividing net job change into job creation and job destruction, and further into establishment-
size groups, we are able to grasp the routes through which trade shocks affect net job change
and to what extent. For example, the negative job effect of import competition may result from
several possible reactions, such as restraining job creation in small, surviving establishments and
accelerating job destruction by large establishments’ exist, which the present study can quantify.
There are three strands of research that are closely related to the subject of this paper: the China
shock on regional labor market, job creation and destruction by establishments, and worker reallo-
cation attributed to international trade. The first deals with the impact of trade shocks from China
on the local labor market, on which Autor et al. (2013) provided an influential study.2 Balsvik et al.
2Many papers focusing import effects from China have been published since the 2010s, arguably for three reasons.
First, for many countries, imports from China have seen an unparalleled upsurge in terms of both volume and ratio
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(2015) and Taniguchi (2019) applied its method to different countries to obtain contrasting results:
the former reported that the import competition from China tended to push low-skilled workers
out of the labor force in Norway, whereas the latter reported that imports from China actually in-
creased the number of local manufacturing workers in Japan.3 Dauth et al. (2014) considered both
import and export sides and found that the striking augmentation of German trade with China and
Eastern Europe increased German manufacturing jobs. Additionally, some studies proposed that
the direct negative effect of import shocks on manufacturing employment was more than offset by
the positive effect of import shocks on non-manufacturing sector and export shocks (Donoso et al.,
2015; Feenstra et al., 2017; Feenstra and Sasahara, 2018; Wang et al., 2018). Most of these studies
used a shift-share regressor for trade shocks to local labor market. Ada˜o et al. (2018), Borusyak
et al. (2018), Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) scrutinized the statistical properties of shift-share
specifications and demonstrated the significance of their findings by applying their methodology
to the dataset of Autor et al. (2013) and comparing the results.
This research estimates the impact of import and export shocks on manufacturing jobs in Japan.
One feature that differentiates this study from previous ones is that it uses not only total job changes
but also their industry and regional factors as dependent variables, the latter being obtained from the
Amiti–Weinstein decomposition method. The original motivation of Amiti and Weinstein (2018)
was to investigate bank–firm loan movements by separately identifying time-varying bank supply
shocks from firm-borrowing shocks. The present study is the first attempt to apply their method-
ology to another field and decompose employment changes for evaluating industry- and region-
specific shocks. Then, I estimate how much of the industry and regional shocks have accrued
since the end of 1980s. Second, the emergence of China as a great economic power and its inclusion into the world
market is nearly exogenous to these countries. These characteristics help researchers identify causal effects. Third,
the strengthening import competition from China has actually been both a public and a professional concern in many
countries.
3Taniguchi (2019) considered the background of this result that cheaper intermediate imports would increase pro-
ductivity of some Japanese firms who use them as inputs and would lead them to hire more workers. The present study
reports the negative employment effect of imports from Asia and China, probably because of the difference of data
source, as well as the different definitions of Japanese regions, industries, and analyzing period.
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from international trade. One advantage of applying the Amiti–Weinstein decomposition is that
the aggregation of estimated industry and regional shocks exactly replicates the economy-wide net
change in manufacturing jobs, even accounting for a new industry having sprung up in a region.
A related noteworthy benefit is that the inclusion or exclusion of an industry–region interaction
term does not affect the magnitude of industry and regional shocks as long as the interaction term
is defined to vary at the industry and regional levels. The present study later proposes the method
of using industry shocks in industry-level data for estimating trade impacts on job changes as the
base method and calls it a conservative one, as regional shocks and shift-share regressors are not
used in it.
The second strand of research is concerned with job reallocation attributed to international
trade. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis et al. (1996) revealed that the magnitude of job
reallocation and its characteristics are affected not only by firms’ ages and sizes, industry charac-
teristics, and macroeconomic performance. Their succeeding ones additionally analyzed the effect
of other factors such as labor market regulations (Haltiwanger et al., 2014) and oil prices (Davis
and Haltiwanger, 2001; Herrera and Karaki, 2015; Herrera et al., 2017). International transactions
also affect job reallocation. Klein et al. (2003) indicated that an appreciation of the dollar resulted
in a significant increase in the rate of job destruction and a reduction in the rate of net employment
growth from US industry-level data. Baumgarten (2015) showed that the increase in exports by
German firms enhanced job churn. Kondo (2018) demonstrated a trade model that rationalized the
finding that increased foreign competition was correlated with higher job destruction and lower job
creation in the US.
Given the above, the present study shares the same interest with Klein et al. (2003), Baum-
garten (2015), and Kondo (2018) about trade shocks’ effects on job reallocation and complements
each analysis. First, instead of exchange rate, I use exports and imports as independent variables.
Klein et al. (2003) assumed that the exchange rate affected job reallocation through changes of the
volume and prices of trading goods, i.e., using trade volumes as independent variables is a more
direct way of examining the job effects of international transactions. Second, I address the endo-
geneity problem of trade more directly than Baumgarten (2015) and use export supplies from Asia
4
and from developed countries as the instrument variable (IV) for Japanese imports from Asia and
export to the world, respectively. Third, I propose that increased foreign competition hinders job
creation in Japan, the finding conforming to the observations by Kondo (2018) regarding the U.S.
The third strand of research deals with worker reallocation. Empirical research on trade impact
on worker reallocation has ranged from reduced-form regression with longitudinal worker data
(Autor et al., 2014; Ebenstein et al., 2014; Hummels et al., 2014) to the structural estimation of
underlying parameters (Artuc¸ et al., 2010; Dix-Carneiro, 2014; Artuc¸ and McLaren, 2015; Cos¸ar
et al., 2016; Caliendo et al., 2019). Whereas the number of job destruction and creation indicates
the minimum sum of possible workers leaving and obtaining jobs over a certain period, the analysis
of job reallocation is beneficial in that it enables us to directly observe the behavior of labor-demand
entities. I show in the next section that more than half job creation or destruction is promulgated by
the entry or the exit of establishments. The dynamics of establishments as entities of labor demand
is, however, sometimes hard to grasp in the structural estimation because setup for establishments
is modeled but does not come to the forefront, or the behavior of establishments is estimated for
those larger than a given threshold. Thus, the analysis of job reallocations complements that of
worker reallocation to understand labor adjustment induced by international trade.
This study makes five main findings on the impact of trade shocks on job reallocation. First,
trade shocks change the number of manufacturing jobs through industry shocks. Their effects
through regional shocks are statistically insignificant. Second, trade shocks impact the number
of jobs through establishments’ entry and exit than that through the adjustment of surviving es-
tablishments’ job sizes. Third, trade shocks affect job creation in smaller establishments and job
destruction in larger establishments in a statistically significant manner. Fourth, implied job change
from trade shocks accounts for 12–15 percent of total manufacturing job decreases in Japan from
1996 to 2016. These figures are approximately half that obtained from widely used region-level
analysis. Fifth, the sum of the trade shocks increases job reallocation in larger establishments and
decreases it in smaller establishments.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of job changes in
Japan and is followed by the methodology of empirical analysis and its background information in
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Section 3. In Section 4, I present results of the trade effects on job changes and propose a conserva-
tive estimation which uses industry shocks as a dependent variable in cross-industry specification.
Section 5 compares the numbers of implied job changes due to trade shocks based on the present
study and on a widely used method in previous studies. Finally, Section 6 concludes this research.
2 Overview of job reallocation in Japan
I employ three types of censuses to construct panel data covering all Japanese establishments
from 1996 to 2016: The Establishment and Enterprise Census from 1996, 1999, 2001, 2004,
and 2006; The Economic Census for Business Frame from 2009 and 2014; and The Economic
Census for Business Activity in 2012 and 2016. The censuses were conducted once every few
years by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. They recorded
information such as name, address, identification (ID) number, and the number of workers of all
establishments and firms in Japan.4 Whereas ID numbers change in every census, we can construct
establishment panel data from 1996 to 2016 because the censuses of and after 1999 contain ID
numbers for all establishments for both current and previous censuses. The establishment panel
data I completed for this study comprises private establishments, displaying the number of jobs
in each establishment at almost 5-year intervals: 1996–2001–2006–2012–2016. The number of
establishment pairs in a 5-year period (including entries and exits) adds up to 29.3 million over
four periods (1996–2001, 2001–2006, 2006–2012, and 2012–2016) for all industries, and to 2.8
4Explaining in detail, The Establishment and Enterprise Census was conducted every two to three years in order
to collect the basic information of all Japanese establishments and to serve as a master sampling framework for other
official statistical surveys. This census was incorporated into two newly started economic censuses after its last imple-
mentation in 2006. The Economic Census for Business Frame launched in 2009. It is conducted almost every 5 years,
and its survey items are similar to The Establishment and Enterprise Census. The Economic Census for Business
Activity, being launched in 2012 and conducted almost every 5 years, was designed to integrate not only The Estab-
lishment and Enterprise Census but also other government surveys and therefore encompasses wider range of survey
items about both establishments and their head offices, including items regarding their business activities. These
censuses cover all establishments except individual proprietorships belonging to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries,
establishments belonging to household services, and establishments belonging to foreign public affairs.
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million for manufacturing industries. The corresponding numbers for 10-year period panel data
(1996–2006–2016) are 16.6 million and 1.6 million over two periods, respectively.5
Panel A in Figure 1 shows the number of manufacturing establishments by size from 1996 to
2016. There were about 763,000 establishments in 1996. Around half of them belonged to the
category of the smallest establishments (four or fewer jobs), and the largest category (100 or more
jobs) accounted for as little as 2.4 percent. In 2016, the total number of establishments diminished
by 40 percent to about 456,000. Rates of decline during two decades differed by establishment-size
category: small-size categories had the largest rates of decline (43.5 percent for establishments of
those with 5–9 jobs and 42.1 percent for the establishments of those with 1–4 jobs), whereas the
largest size category had the lowest one (22 percent for those with 100 and more jobs).
Panel B shows the number of total jobs by establishment size during the same period. The
number of jobs in an establishment is defined as total posts for workers who engaged themselves
in economic activities at that establishment. These include individual proprietors, unpaid family
workers, paid directors, full-time employees, contract employees, part timers, temporary employ-
ees, and employees loaned or dispatched from other establishments under separate management.
Employees loaned or dispatched to other establishments under separate management are excluded
because they do not actually work for that establishment.6 There were 13.2 million manufacturing
jobs in 1996, decreasing by 30 percent to 9.2 million in 2016. This rate of decline was smaller than
that of the number of establishments (40 percent) in Panel A. Thus, the average number of jobs in
an establishment increased during this period. The order of job shares by establishment size is op-
5Intervals for evaluating job changes are not standardized because the survey dates changed during and after 2012.
The censuses in 1996, 2001, and 2006 were conducted on October 1st, whereas those in 2012 and 2016 were conducted
on February 1st and June 1st, respectively. Therefore, the interval of evaluating job changes from 2006 to 2012 was
actually 64 months, and the period of job change from 2012 to 2016 was 52 months. For convenience, though, I refer
to a 5-year period and a 10-year period throughout this study.
6I neither divide the total number of jobs into job types nor estimate each type separately in this study, because I
cannot obtain the accurate time-series data of jobs of each type. This results from the change in the headings referring
to employees loaned or dispatched to other establishments. Their number is itemized separately from other types of
workers in the Establishment and Enterprise Census, whereas it is reported as the number of the sum of other types in
the Economic Census.
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Figure 1: Manufacturing job changes in Japan
posite to the order of the number of establishments. In 1996, the category for jobs belonging to the
largest establishments (100 and more jobs) accounted for 44 percent, the largest share among five
establishment-size categories, whereas jobs belonging to the smallest establishments (1–4 jobs)
accounted for 7 percent, the smallest. The order is the same across all five years.
8
Under the steady two-decade decline of both manufacturing establishments and jobs, active
churning has occurred. Panel C shows the change in the number of establishments during five-
year periods, giving us the ratio to the total number of establishments during the first year of the
period. For example, the net decrease of establishments from 1996 to 2001 was 14.8 percent of
the total number of establishments in 1996, which was the sum of 11.0 percent of the entries and
25.9 percent of the exits.7 There were 10 percent or more establishments entering manufacturing
sectors during each period, equaling almost half of the exits. The active entry of establishments
was observed even in a diminishing sector.
Job creation and destruction across 5-year periods is summarized in Panel D.8 Created jobs are
categorized into those created by entry establishments and those created by continuing establish-
ments, and destroyed jobs are divided into those eliminated by exiting establishments and those
eliminated by continuing establishments.9 Each of the four groups had a sizable ratio compared
with the ratio of net change, which vividly demonstrates the active job churning. For example, the
total number of jobs decreased by 12.2 percent from 1996 to 2001, in which 9.9 percent of jobs
were created by entries, 8.8 percent were created by continuers, 15.2 percent were eliminated by
exits, and 15.8 percent were eliminated by continuers. The change of jobs due to establishments’
7Establishment exit and entry include relocations to different base survey districts. When an establishment moves
from one base survey district to another, that establishment is recorded as an exit from the former district and an entry
in the latter district. This definition is the same as that in the censuses before 2006. They changed the definition
in 2009, and they now treat moved establishments as continuers as long as they are connectable to corresponding
establishments from a prior census. For consistency of definition, I chose continuing establishments that actually
moved from a different basic survey district, and I treated them as exits in their previous districts and as entries in new
districts.
8 I choose establishment as the unit to define job creation and job destruction. Using both establishment and firm
as units of analysis has benefits in that it enables us to observe reallocation both across and within firms, as Fort
et al. (2018) described. In this research, I use establishment as a unit to grasp the total impact of trade shocks on job
reallocation, regardless of across or within firms.
9Throughout this research, job destruction is defined with negative figures. Many previous studies about job
reallocation, such as Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), Davis et al. (1996), and Herrera and Karaki (2015), expressed
job destruction using positive figures. I use negative figures to remain consistent with job creation by applying the
framework of Amiti and Weinstein (2018) and interpreting the results.
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entry and exit is larger than that of continuing establishments. The increase in jobs induced by en-
tries was larger than that in continuers in all four 5-year periods, and the decrease of jobs by exits
was larger than that in continuers in three periods out of four. Entry and exit of establishments are
the dominant forces of job churn. In other words, the change of establishments’ extensive margin
is larger than the change of their intensive margin with respect to the number of manufacturing job
changes.
The impact of job changes per establishment-size category on total job changes is illustrated in
Panel E. The horizontal axis represents five size categories of establishments (i.e., number of jobs
in each establishment) in 2012, and the vertical axis represents the ratio of job changes from 2012
to 2016 to total jobs in 2012. These are induced by continuing and exiting establishments in each
category. The increase in jobs by entering establishments between 2012 and 2016 is not reported
in Panel E because these entries had not yet appeared in 2012. Panel E shows that the impact of
each category on total change of jobs becomes larger as that category covers establishments with
more jobs. This corresponds to the fact that the category for larger establishments has the larger
share of jobs, as depicted in Panel B. The category of the largest establishments (100 or more jobs)
has the largest impact on total changes of jobs. Exits and continuers in this category decrease as
much as 9.5 percent and 5.5 percent, respectively, of jobs existing in 2012. The decrease of jobs
by exits is larger than the decrease by continuers in all categories, meaning that exits dominate job
shrinking in all scale of establishments. The data in other years share the same characteristics as
Panel E.
The main findings of Figure 1 are twofold. First, whereas the steady decline of manufacturing
jobs is an eye-catching phenomenon, the job churning behind this trend is more vital. Because
international trade could affect both job creation and job destruction, analyzing the effect of trade
shocks on both sides helps to grasp the clearer picture of trade impacts on job churning. Second,
the entry and exit of establishments predominate the increase and decrease of jobs by continuing
establishments in job churning. This observation offers the possibility that trade impacts on jobs
through the change of establishments’ extensive margin differ from it through the change of their
intensive margin.
10
3 Strategy for estimation
This section discusses my methodology of empirical analysis and background information. It
covers the method of obtaining industry and regional shocks, an outline of Japanese trade, the con-
struction of trade variables and IV, the regression equation of industry shocks on trade shocks, the
definition of employment areas and industries, and the characteristics of shocks and job realloca-
tions by industry and region. The results of empirical analyses are reported next.
3.1 Industry and regional shocks
To control for region-specific shocks that are irrelevant to trade shocks, Autor et al. (2013) and
succeeding studies used the manufacturing employment share of the working-age population as a
dependent variable and incorporated some regional variables, such as percentage of employment
in manufacturing and census division dummies as independent variables. The benefit of using the
decomposition method provided by Amiti and Weinstein (2018) is to discern the part of actual
variations in job changes that is idiosyncratic to a particular region in a more straightforward
manner.
The Amiti–Weinstein decomposition requires two values of a variable under examination with
respect to time to decompose the percentage change of the variable into several factors. Let Eei,r,t
denote the total number of jobs in an establishment, e, which is the element of a set of industry,









i,r,t. Let DEi,t and
DEr,t denote the percentage change of Ei,t and Er,t, respectively, from time t to t+ 1. Therefore,
DEi,t ≡ Ei,t+1 − Ei,t
Ei,t
,
DEr,t ≡ Er,t+1 − Er,t
Er,t
.
10I use establishment-level, not firm-level, industry classification for this study. When the industry of an establish-
ment at the beginning of a 5- or 10-year period differs from that at the end year of a period, I classify that establishment
as an industry at the beginning year.
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I apply the method to job changes to obtain three shocks. First, regional shock a˙r,t is a set of
factors that cause all manufacturing jobs to change uniformly in region r over time t, regardless of
whether they are indigenous to a particular region, related to regional demographic dynamics and
characteristics of local goods, service, and factor market, or they are provoked by other regions
and industries, related to ripple effects covering all of the region through a production network.
Second, industry shock b˙i,t is a set of factors that influence all jobs in industry i in time t. It
includes direct and indirect effects of market structure, technological progress, demand shift, and
trade shocks in any industries. Third, a common shock, c¯t, is a common factor to shift jobs in all
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= 1. A common shock in
year t, c¯t, is defined as the sum of median regional shock and median industry shock in time t.11
Region-year shock a˙r,t and industry-year shock b˙i,t are the differences between the actual shock
and the median shock in time t. Equation (1) states that the percentage change of employment
in industry i is driven by its industry-year-specific factor, a weighted average of all region-year-
specific factors, and a common year shock. Similarly, equation (2) shows that the percentage
change of employment in region r is driven by region-year-specific factors, a weighted average of
all industry-year-specific factors, and a common year shock.
Trade shocks affect DEi,t and DEr,t through various potential channels. First, the change of
import or export of goods categorized in industry i directly affect DEi,t and DEr,t through b˙i,t.
Strengthening import competition in industry i decreases its domestic production and therefore its
labor demand, whereas the expanding export of goods i has the opposite effect. Second, b˙i,t would
11Amiti and Weinstein (2018) chose a median region and a median industry as numeraires for solving Equations
(1) and (2). Choosing any other region and industry as numeraires can also solve this set of equations and provide
regional and industry shocks with the same variations.
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change due to trade shocks on downstream industries in input–output space. For example, when
the imports of motor vehicles increase, it decreases production of not only automobile industry
itself but also other upstream industries such as steel and electric machinery. Third, if a trade
shock has job effects in region r differently than other regions, it is represented as a part of a˙r,t.
For example, this includes for example, regional job reallocation effects, ripple effects on jobs in
regional input–output space, and industry agglomeration and deagglomeration.
There are two points worth noting here about these interpretations. First, the definition of
industry and regional shocks is different from that of direct and indirect effects of trade shocks.
Indirect effect of trade shocks through production network is classified as industry shocks if the
job reallocation effects or the ripple effects are similar in any region. Second, one might think
it is better to use an industry–region interaction term for regional indirect effects of trade shocks.
Proposition 1 of Amiti and Weinstein (2018) proved, however, that the inclusion or exclusion of the
term did not affect the magnitude of a˙r,t and b˙i,t, as long as one is willing to define the components
of an interaction term varying only at the industry and regional levels. This is based on the fact that
any interaction term can be divided into industry-fixed effects, regional fixed effects, and residuals
being orthogonal to both effects. I take a stance on this formulation in this study.
DEi,t and DEr,t can be divided into subgroups based on establishment sizes, job creation, and
job destruction without modifying the system. Let Ej,ei,r,t be the number of jobs in an establish-




i,r,t is the total jobs in establishments of size j in industry
i at time t. Then, the change of Eji,t from time t to t + 1, expressed as DE
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DEjr,t in the Amiti–Weinstein decomposition method in Equations (1) and (2), three shocks for
establishments in size j group are obtained. Job creation and job destruction, by all establishments
and by establishments of size j, are also defined in the same form as net job change. When com-
paring the number of jobs in each establishment of size j at the beginning year, Ej,ei,r,t, and at the
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Figure 2: Manufacturing export and import values in Japan
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definitions.
3.2 Trade variables
Figure 2 represents the change of manufacturing trade values in Japan from 1996 to 2015. There
are three categories of trade values: exports to the world; imports from Asia; and imports from
Europe and North America. Because imports from Asia do not include imports from the Middle
East, from which the vast majority of imports is petroleum products, the sum of import values in
this figure becomes small compared to the total value of exports. Japanese trade data are obtained
from Japan Customs, and their nominal values are deflated by Japanese GDP deflators.12
Japanese manufacturing exports had increased and hit the peak over 80 trillion Japanese Yen
(JPY) by 2007, then plummeted to 52.4 trillion JPY in 2009 because of global economic down-
turn. Afterwards, exports increased again, but export values in 2015 were still below the peak
values. Manufacturing imports from Asia had more than tripled from 11.2 trillion JPY in 1996
12Japanese trade data are provided by Japan Customs at http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/
index_e.htm.
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to 37.9 trillion JPY in 2014, notwithstanding the disturbance from the global economic downturn.
Manufacturing imports from Europe and North America were larger than those from Asia until
the 1990s, but the growth rate of the latter has outpaced that of the former, and the imports from
Europe and North America are almost half of the imports from Asia around 2015. This vividly
shows the impact of an emerging and developing Asia on Japanese economy. The share of Chinese
trade increased in both imports from Asia and exports to the world during this period. Japan is
geographically close to the epicenter of the China shock. Therefore, it has been expanding eco-
nomic transactions with it from the earlier period and by larger values than European and American
countries.
In this study, I consider mainly 10-year periods for changes of jobs and trade, following Autor
et al. (2013), Dauth et al. (2014), and Acemoglu et al. (2016), to name just a few. I use three
census data in 1996, 2006, and 2016. In addition to decadal changes, quinquennial changes are
used for robustness check. Regarding trade shocks, I consider two groups to estimate their effect
on job reallocation: imports from Asia and exports to the world, accounting for 108 manufacturing
industries. Imports from Asia represent import shocks, whereas exports to the world represent
export shocks.13 Because one country exports and imports goods simultaneously, using both inter-
national transactions should produce balanced results. Imports from Europe and North America
are not considered here because introducing them would cause estimation challenges, such as mul-
ticollinearity and weak identification. Imports from China are used instead of imports from Asia
for robustness check.
13Prior studies focused on import competition from China. However, in this paper, I categorize imports from Asia,
including Mainland China, as one group and use that as an index of import competition. This is because treating
imports from China independently is not justifiable in the Japanese context for two reasons. First, import shocks
from Mainland China are presumably dependent on those from other Asian countries for the Japanese labor market,
partly because internationalized Asian manufacturers have developed dense supply chain networks covering Japan
and other Asian countries and they decide their regional production strategically (Kimura and Ando, 2005; Kimura
and Obashi, 2016). Second, imported goods from China and those from Southeast Asia and East Asia, excluding
China, have similar characteristics and are interpreted as substitutes for each other (Pham et al., 2017; Nguyen and
Wu, 2018). Therefore, they are considered to have similar effects on Japanese manufacturing establishments, whereas,
simultaneously, Japanese imports from Asia, except China, increased in size compared to those from China.
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Industry- and region-level trade indices for the present study contain both direct and indirect
impacts of trades. Acemoglu et al. (2016) formulated the impact of imports in all industries on













where dmj is the change in industry j’s nominal import values and xj,i is the nominal value of
industry i’s output purchased by industry j. The first term of the right-hand side is the ratio of the
change in industry i’s imports to its output that represents the direct import impact on the exposed
industry. The second term expresses the upstream impact on industry i from industries to which it
sells its product through input–output linkages. The term is the weighted sum of trade shocks faced
by purchasers of industry i’s output. The input–output network potentially propagates trade shocks
to downstream industries. However, this study does not examine this effect from the expectation
of high substitutability between domestic and imported upstream goods in downstream industries.
In fact, Acemoglu et al. (2016) reported statistically insignificant results of downstream import
effects and argued the same reason for this imprecision.
I employ two types of per-unit trades for dmi
yi
in Equation (3): trade exposure ratios and per-job
trades. They are defined for not only imports but also exports in a symmetrical manner. Trade
exposure ratios are directly from dmi
yi



















where ∆JXi,t ≡ JXi,t+1 − JXi,t is the total change in Japanese import of goods classified as manufac-
turing industry i from Asia to Japan (when X = imA) or the total change in exports from Japan
to the world (when X = ex) between time period t (JXi,t ) and t + 1 (J
X
i,t+1).
14 Denominator yi in
14Job changes from 1996 to 2006 corresponds to trade value changes from 1996 to 2006. The interval of evaluating
job change from 2006 to 2016 was actually 116 months. Thus, the corresponding change of annual trade is obtained




is an output of goods classified as industry i in 1995, obtained from Census of Manufacture,
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Both ∆JXi,t and yi are deflated by Japanese GDP defla-
tors to be at 2005’s value. Trade exposure ratios are similar to trade indices used in Autor et al.
(2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016). xj,i and yi in
xj,i
yi
are obtained from 2011 Input–Output Tables
for Japan.15 ∆TXr,t in Equation (5) is the sum of ∆T
X
i,t in region r with the weight of the industry
share of regional jobs at time t, Ei,r,t
Er,t
. This shift-share instrument (Bartik instrument) represents
the change of trades in a Japanese region r. Equations (4) and (5) are based on the assumption that
the national change of trade shock in an industry is apportioned equally among all jobs belonging
to that industry.
In a setup of Acemoglu et al. (2016), if the output elasticities of labor in their Cobb-Douglas
production function as well as wages are same all across the industries, nominal output and the
number of workers have the same ratio in all industries from profit maximization. Assuming that




. This index is used by Autor et al. (2013) and Dauth et al. (2014), to name just a













Regional trade impact indices are obtained from Equation (5).
Basic statistics concerning trade impact indices and job reallocation are summarized in Table
1. Import impact index from trade exposure ratios in this study exceeds the corresponding one
15The calculation of the full chain of implied responses requires Leontief inverse matrix. However, I am unable
to obtain the inverse matrix because coefficients of some industries among 108 are obtained from the same industry
in Input–Output Tables; therefore, the rank of the matrix is less than 108. Acemoglu et al. (2016) showed that the
results from using full indirect upstream effect has little difference from those from using first-order trade index,
which supports my view that the approach for upstream effects using first-order trade index in the present study does
not undermine the credibility of the outcome.
16In Equation (4), denominator yi in
∆JXi,t
yi




changing over t. These definitions are from previous studies mentioned in the text. Though there exists an inconsis-
tency, I follow conventional methods.
17
in Autor et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2016), and import impact index from per-job trades
exceeds the corresponding one in Autor et al. (2013) and Dauth et al. (2014). This is not because
the definition of trade impact indices are different but because the regional coverage of trading
partners is larger in this study and Japan has actively engaged in trade activities with Asian coun-
tries, including China, than American and European countries.17 Regarding job changes, only job
creation and job destruction are reported because net job change is the sum of them.
I regress industry shocks and regional shocks on trade shocks to observe the impact of trade
shocks on job changes. In the case of the industry shocks, b˙i,t in Equation (1) is regressed on







b˙i,t in Equation (2) is regressed on region-level














t β3 + r,t, (8)
Y
′
t β3 in Equation (7) equals the negative value of the trade effect on an industry which has median
value of b˙i,t, that is, an industry of b˙i,t = 0 in each year. Similarly, Y
′
t β3 in Equation (8) is the








a˙r,t in Equation (1) is used as a dependent variable instead of b˙i,t in Equation
(7), and a˙r,t in Equation (2) is used instead of B˙r,t in Equation (8).
3.3 Instrumental variables
Many studies following Autor et al. (2013) used Chinese exports to developed countries for the
construction of IV for the changes of import exposure from China to address their endogeneity.
17For example, import impact index using per-job trades from Asia increased from 1996 to 2016 by 2.97 million
JPY of 2005 (more than 70 percent of the value is direct impact index of imports from Asia). Using an exchange rate
of JPY 117.75 per USD in 2007 and a decrease of the GDP deflator of 1.69 percent from 2005 to 2007 (Japan was
in a deflationary period), this is convertible to 24,800 USD in 2007. Additionally, it is equivalent to 21,700 Euros in
2005 using an exchange rate of JPY 137.07 per Euro in 2005. Both are significantly larger than the values reported in
Appendix Table 2 by Autor et al. (2013) and Table A.3 of the online appendix of Dauth et al. (2014).
18An alternation in a numerator for industry shocks in Equations (1) and (2) changes all b˙i,t and B˙r,t by the same
amount, as does βˆ3 in Equations (7) and (8). Therefore, it does not affect βˆ1 and βˆ2.
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Table 1: Means and standard deviations of main variables
I. Levels II. 10-year changes
1996 2006 2016 1996-2006 2006-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trade exposure ratios (percent)
Import impact index 8.18 13.76 17.88 9.10 6.53
(SD, industry-level) (15.86) (19.73) (23.94) (10.66) (9.91)
(SD, region-level) (3.45) (4.14) (4.79) (2.26) (1.48)
Export impact index 20.46 37.68 40.77 15.08 1.65
(SD, industry-level) (18.07) (32.87) (38.68) (17.15) (20.73)
(SD, region-level) (4.25) (8.26) (9.32) (3.83) (3.21)
Per-job trades (million JPY at 2005 value)
Import impact index 0.97 3.07 5.19 1.52 1.45
(SD, industry-level) (1.17) (3.74) (6.91) (1.76) (2.54)
(SD, region-level) (0.23) (0.83) (1.36) (0.36) (0.38)
Export impact index 4.82 10.45 12.01 3.83 0.02
(SD, industry-level) (4.91) (10.62) (11.88) (5.15) (4.30)
(SD, region-level) (1.27) (2.83) (3.52) (1.36) (0.82)
Job changes (percent)
Job creation 29.03 33.91
(SD, industry-level) (10.11) (9.29)
(SD, region-level) (5.70) (5.73)
Job destruction −47.36 −48.02
(SD, industry-level) (8.94) (8.29)
(SD, region-level) (6.35) (6.70)
Notes: N = 108 for industry-level figures and N = 228 for region-level figures. Statistics
in Columns 1–3 are weighted by the number of jobs at the corresponding years. Statistics
in Columns 4 and 5 are weighted by the number of jobs at the beginning year of each term.
Trade values in 2015 are used for calculating the levels of trade impact indices in 2016. Job
creation and job destruction are not defined for levels.
The present study takes a slightly different approach that all Asian exports to the world except
to Japan is used to construct an IV for the decadal change of Japanese imports from Asia for
Japanese industry i, ∆IV exAi,t , and Japanese region r, ∆IV
exA
r,t . In the case of trade impact indices
using trade exposure ratios, ∆IV exAi,t is obtained from the right-hand side of Equation (4) after
replacing ∆J imAi,t with ∆W
exA
i,t ≡ W exAi,t+1 − W exAi,t , which is the corresponding change of Asian
exports of industry i-goods to the world except to Japan from time t (W exAi,t ) to time t+ 1 (W
exA
i,t+1)
at the same period as ∆J imAi,t .
19 ∆IV exAr,t is obtained in the same procedure from the right-hand side
19Autor et al. (2013) used employment levels of a decade prior to the trade data when constructing IV, because
they assumed that contemporaneous employment by region was affected by anticipated imports from China. Dauth
et al. (2014) followed their method. Acknowledging the legitimacy of their argument, I use the number of jobs at
the beginning year of 10-year periods for change of trade, as formulated in Equations (5) and (6), for two reasons
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of Equation (5). ∆IV exAi,t and ∆IV
exA
r,t for trade impact indices using per-job trades are obtained
similarly from Equations (5) and (6).
Regarding the construction of IV for exports, Dauth et al. (2014) looked at it from demand
side and used import demand of China and Eastern Europe for the IV of German exports to these
regions. In this paper, however, I use export supply of Europe to the world and that of North
America to the world, both except to Japan, to construct two IV of Japanese exports to the world.
This is based on the observation that world import demand arguably determines exports from
developed and developing countries differently. Therefore, exports from other developed countries
appropriately identify the exogenous component of changing world import demand from Japan.
Following this specification, two industry-level IV for Japanese exports to the world are obtained
from European exports and North American exports. ∆IV exEi,t is constructed from the right-hand
side of Equations (4) or (6) after replacing ∆Jexi,t in these equations with ∆W
exE
i,t ≡ W exEi,t+1−W exEi,t ,
being the change of exports of industry i-goods from Europe to the world except to Japan from




i,t is constructed similarly by using exports of
industry i-goods from North America to the world except to Japan. Two region-level IV, ∆IV exEr,t




i,t , respectively, with
using Ei,r,t
Er,t
as a weight, same as Equation (5).20
3.4 Employment areas and industries
Following Autor et al. (2013) and Dauth et al. (2014), I define regional economic units in Japan
from the concept of local labor markets. For this purpose, I adopt the concept of urban employ-
in the Japanese context. First, using lagged employment levels for constructing IV excludes changes induced by
demographic changes (e.g., population concentration in Tokyo area and population aging) and natural disasters (e.g.,
Great Hanshin–Awaji Earthquake of 1995), occurring in the following 10 years, exogenous to trade changes, from the
estimation. Consequently, lagged employment levels become inappropriate weights in IV for trade exposure measures
of 10 years’ later. Second, imports and exports change in the same direction in many regions. Therefore, the likelihood
of simultaneity bias between the anticipation of imports and the following labor movement is limited.
20World trade data are provided by World Integrated Trade Solution at https://wits.worldbank.org.
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ment areas, developed by the Center for Spatial Information Service at the University of Tokyo.21
I employ the demarcation of metropolitan and micropolitan employment areas in 2010 as the defi-
nition of regions in this research. There are 228 regions per period.22 Their sizes vary. The Tokyo
metropolitan area had over 3 million manufacturing jobs in 1996, the largest number among all
regions, whereas the Kutchan micropolitan area in Hokkaido had as little as 476 manufacturing
jobs in the same year. Some municipalities did not belong to any regions: the coverage of jobs by
all regions was about 95 percent. For example, the number of total manufacturing jobs in Japan
was 13.2 million nationwide, whereas that in 228 regions was 12.6 million in 1996.
There are 108 manufacturing industries, ranging in the number of jobs in 1996 from 524 for
fur skins to 939,575 for motor vehicles, parts, and accessories. Petroleum and non-ferrous metals
refining is excluded from the analysis. Job information of each industry was collected from estab-
lishments in metropolitan and micropolitan employment areas in 2010. Therefore, the sum of jobs
over industries is the same as that over regions.
3.5 Job changes and shocks by industry and region
Figure 3 illustrates job creation and job destruction by industry and by region from 1996 to 2006,
the period when Japanese trade expanded rapidly for both exports and imports. The size of the
symbols represents the number of jobs. Panel A shows job creation and destruction of 52 indus-
tries which have 60,000 jobs or more in 1996, among all 108 industries. The ratio of job creation
ranges from 9.9 percent (woven fabric mills) to 55.6 percent (medical instruments and apparatus),
whereas job destruction ranges from −70.5 percent (textile outer garments and shirts) to −32.3
percent (oil and fat products, soaps, synthetic detergents, surface-active agents, and paints). Indus-
tries are dispersed across these spaces. Panel B exhibits the distributions with the same scale as
21The definitions and the code tables of urban employment areas are available on http://www.csis.
u-tokyo.ac.jp/UEA/uea_code_e.htm.
22When collecting establishments into urban employment areas, I deleted establishments located in 11 municipal-
ities where more than one-quarter of each area was designated as evacuation zones by a disaster during any time in
the analysis period. There were two disasters by which municipalities met this condition: the Miyake Island volcano
eruption (an evacuation zone was designated for 2000–2005) and the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011–present).
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Figure 3: Job changes by industry and by region: 1996–2006
Panel A by region. The panel reports 107 metropolitan employment areas among all 228 regions.
Three dominant regions (Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya) are located within narrow ranges for both job
creation (24.6 to 28.4 percent) and job destruction (−53.4 to −42.9 percent).
Ratios of job change are decomposed into regional shocks, industry shocks, and a common
shock by using Equations (1) and (2). Panels A to C of Figure 4 shows the results of decompos-
ing shocks for 52 large industries and 107 metropolitan employment areas with respect to net job
change, job creation, and job destruction from 1996 to 2006. The horizontal line represents re-
gional shocks (a˙r,t), the vertical line represents industry shocks (b˙i,t), and the sizes of the symbols
represents the number of jobs in each region–industry group (Ei,r,t ). Industry shocks of 56 small
industries and regional shocks of 121 micropolitan employment areas are not shown in these pan-
els. In all three cases, the ranges of distribution of regional and industry shocks are similar. This
implies that industry shocks and regional shocks are potentially influential to job changes to the
same degree.23
Figure 5 contains four panels that depict the changes of trade impact indices by industry and
by region in Japan from 1996 to 2006. Panel A shows the changes of import and export impact
23Each industry or regional shock in Figure 4 is expressed as a relative value, being the difference from a me-
dian value. I employ the distribution of shocks, rather than their values, to explain their relative importance to job
changes, because a common shock, the sum of medium regional and industry shocks, affects all industry–region pairs
identically.
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Figure 4: Industry shocks and regional shocks: 1996–2006
indices obtained from trade exposure ratios. Indices for 52 large industries are depicted. Most
industries experienced increased both imports from Asia and exports to the world at the same time.
Thus, whereas import competition destroys some manufacturing jobs, concurrent export increases
creates new jobs in many industries in Japan. Panel B depicts the changes of trade impact indices
using trade exposure ratios. Indices for 107 metropolitan employment areas are reported. The
scales of the axes are the same as Panel A. Regionally aggregated trade changes vary smaller than
industry-level trade changes because of the nature of the weighted sum of the former variable, and
all regions experience increases in both imports from Asia and exports to the world during this
period. Panels C and D are the cases when trade impact indices are calculated from per-job trades.
They share the same characteristics as those in Panels A and B.
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Figure 5: Changes of trade impact indices: 1996–2006
4 Estimation results
4.1 Net job change
Panels A–C of Table 2 present second-stage estimation results of regression Equations (7) and (8)
when dependent variables are decadal total job changes in the manufacturing sector (Panel A), its
industry shocks (Panel B), and its regional shocks (Panel C), the latter two being obtained from the
Amiti–Weinstein decomposition of the former one. First-stage result for these three estimations is
the same, which is summarized in Panel D. Reported are estimates and their standard deviations
concerning import impact index from Asia and export impact index to the world used in second-
stage estimation, and those concerning exports from Asia, exports from Europe, and exports from
North America used as IV in first-stage estimation. There are four Columns, expressing two trade
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indices by two units of analyses. Regarding trade indices, Columns 1 and 2 use trade exposure
ratios and Columns 3 and 4 use per-job trades for the construction of trade impact indices. Regard-
ing units of analyses, Columns 1 and 3 employ industry-level job changes, and Columns 2 and 4
employ region-level job changes. An estimator of import or export impact index in a group is the
sum of estimators in its subgroups. For example, an estimator of imports in Column 4 of Panel A
(−4.94) is the sum of estimators of imports in Column 1 of Panels B and C (−2.56 and −2.38,
respectively).
First-stage estimation results in Panel D support my strategy for IV. That is, Japanese imports
from Asia are explained by exports from Asia, and Japanese exports to the world are explained by
exports from Europe and exports from North America, with expected positive signs, high statis-
tical significance, and high F statistics of excluded instruments, except the case of North Ameri-
can exports for export impact index in Column 1. Additionally, Kleibergen–Paap F statistics are
high enough to exclude the possibility of weak instruments, except the case of Column 3, whose
Kleibergen–Paap F statistic is not high enough.
Second-stage estimation results in Panel A when dependent variables are total job changes
show that imports from Asia decrease net employment, whereas exports to the world increase it
with high statistical significance, regardless of trade indices and units of analyses. One intriguing
difference between the case using trade exposure ratios for trade impact indices and the case using
per-job trades is that industry-level estimators and region-level estimators are similar in the former
case, whereas they are widely different in the latter case. Estimators of import impact index are
−2.65 in Column 3 and −4.94 in Column 4, and estimators of export impact index are 1.82 in
Column 3 and 2.62 in Column 4. In either case, the absolute value of estimator is significantly
larger in Column 4. By comparing results in Panels B and C, I found that the difference came from
regional shocks. On one hand, Panel B reports estimators for industry shocks, where an industry-
level estimator and a region-level estimator are similar, for either import impact index or export
impact index, and in either the case of trade exposure rations or the case of per-job trades. All eight
estimators in Panel B are highly significant. On the other hand, Panel C summarizes estimators
for regional shocks, and its Column 4 shows unproportionally large impact of trade than Column
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Table 2: Estimates for net job decadal change in all establishments
Panel A. Second-stage estimates for total job changes
Trade variable: Trade exposure ratios Per-job trades
Data unit: Industry-level Region-level Industry-level Region-leveljob change job change job change job change
Dep. variable: total job changes (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ import impact index −0.95*** −0.99*** −2.65*** −4.94**(0.14) (0.38) (0.80) (1.93)
∆ export impact index 0.55*** 0.57*** 1.82*** 2.62***
(0.11) (0.18) (0.52) (0.57)
Panel B. Second-stage estimates for industry shocks
Dep. variable: industry shocks (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ import impact index −0.95*** −1.15*** −2.56*** −2.56***(0.15) (0.07) (0.81) (0.63)
∆ export impact index 0.55*** 0.53*** 1.79*** 2.04***
(0.11) (0.05) (0.52) (0.20)
Panel C. Second-stage estimates for regional shocks
Dep. variable: regional shocks (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ import impact index 0.00 0.16 −0.09 −2.38(0.03) (0.40) (0.09) (2.04)
∆ export impact index −0.00 0.04 0.04 0.58
(0.02) (0.19) (0.09) (0.61)
Panel D. Statistics and first-stage estimates for Panels A-C
Statistics for Panels A-C (1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations 216 456 216 456
Kleibergen–Paap F statistic 19.8 37.5 6.1 151.7
Dep. variable: ∆ import impact index
∆ Asian export index × 100 4.67*** 4.47*** 4.65*** 4.32***(0.74) (0.20) (0.80) (0.19)
∆ European export index × 100 −0.26 0.44 0.04 0.41**(0.40) (0.27) (0.48) (0.19)
∆ N.A. export index × 100 −1.32 0.13 0.21 0.38(0.92) (0.54) (0.42) (0.45)
R2 0.74 0.98 0.70 0.97
F statistic of excl. instruments 55 2,566 95 1,461
Dep. variable: ∆ export impact index
∆ Asian export index × 100 −1.26 −3.03*** −1.59 −2.20***(0.83) (0.52) (1.10) (0.58)
∆ European export index × 100 4.10*** 8.21*** 8.14*** 12.13***(1.26) (0.99) (1.87) (0.95)
∆ N.A. export index × 100 −1.30 3.77** 4.61*** 7.28***(2.34) (1.58) (1.69) (1.35)
R2 0.34 0.94 0.60 0.95
F statistic of excl. instruments 18 637 13 566
Notes: All estimations also include year dummies. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at an industry level
in Columns 1 and 3 and at a region level in Columns 2 and 4. Models are weighted by the number of jobs in industry
or in region at the start of period. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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3.24 All eight estimators in Panel C are statistically insignificant, meaning that trade effect on
job changes through regional shocks such as job reallocation effects and industry agglomeration,
idiosyncratic to particular regions, is not observable.
This has an important implication for the estimation of trade impact on job changes. If we
use total job changes as a dependent variable and construct import impact index from per-job
trades, Column 4 in Panel A means that the increase of import impact index by 1 million JPY
would decrease Japanese manufacturing jobs by 4.94 percent. However, by decomposing total job
changes into industry and regional shocks, it is found that import competition affects the number of
jobs only through industry shocks, the impact of which being 2.56 percent, whereas its job effect
through regional shocks is insignificant. To avoid overestimation, I examine hereafter trade effects
only through industry shocks and call it a conservative approach. This naturally results in choosing
industry-level job changes, Columns 1 and 3, as the baseline unit of analysis, because the shocks of
interest are also industry-level changes of trade flows. The benefit of industry-level analysis is that
it does not require a shift-share regressor, which needs additional conditions for valid estimation
(Ada˜o et al., 2018, Borusyak et al., 2018, Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018).
4.2 Job creation and destruction
The effect of trade shocks on net job change, summarized in Table 2, is the sum of their effects on
job creation and destruction. This subsection examines trade effects on job creation and destruction
separately as the natural next step because there are various possible effects on them to produce
the same net job change. Net job change is divided into job creation and job destruction, and
they are further divided into those by continuers and by exits or entries. Table 3 summarizes the
second-stage estimators for industry shocks of industry-level job changes by subgroup, such as job
creation by continuers or job destruction by exits. Panel A shows the results when trade impact
24The large impact of trade on regional shocks in Column 4, though not being statistically significant, possibly
results from job relocation under firms’ restructuring plans. For example, if many firms relocate their establishments
in some larger cities facing tougher import competition to smaller towns across the country, a weighted regression
would produce a negative estimator of import impact index for regional shocks.
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indices are used for trade exposure ratios, and Panel B shows those when per-job trades are used.
Column 1 reports the estimators of the net job change. Log wage per worker and the ratio of wage
to value added in 1995 are additionally used in all estimations as a set of industry-specific start-of-
period controls, following Acemoglu et al. (2016); therefore, results in Column 1 of Panel A are
different from those in Column 1 of Panel B in Table 2, and results in Column 1 of Panel B are
different from those in Column 3 of Panel B in Table 2.25 Same as Table 2, an estimator of trade
shocks in a group is the sum of estimators in its subgroups. For example, in Panel A, an estimator
of import impact index in Column 1 (−1.01) is the sum of estimators of imports in Columns 2 and
5 in the same panel (−0.40 and −0.61, respectively), and the former is also the sum of those in
Columns 3 and 4 (−0.16 and −0.24, respectively).
There are two main findings obtained from Panels A and B in common. First, import shocks
hinder total job creation (Column 2) and accelerate total job destruction (Column 5). By contrast,
export shocks promote total job creation and decelerate total job destruction. This finding is in
line with Klein et al. (2003) and Kondo (2018) concerning trade shocks on job reallocation. These
effects are statistically significant, except the case of job creation when trade impact indices are
obtained from per-job trade (Column 2 in Panel B). Second, the impact on net job change through
establishments’ turnover (Columns 4 and 7) is larger than that through the change of job numbers
in continuing establishments (Columns 3 and 6). In other words, trade shocks change the number
of jobs through establishments’ extensive margin larger than through their intensive margin. For
example, in the case of import shocks in Panel A, import shocks decrease total jobs by −0.24
through hindering establishments’ entry (Column 4) and by −0.48 through promoting establish-
ments’ exit (Column 7). The sum of them, −0.72, accounts for more than two thirds of total net
job change, −1.01. In Panel B, the effect of promoting exit becomes dominant and only this single
term represents more than half of decreasing net jobs. The second point is newly found by using
establishment-level panel data.
25Industry-level wage per worker is nominal total wage divided by the number of workers. Industry-level ratio of
wage to value added is nominal total wage divided by nominal value added. These data are obtained from the Census
of Manufacture, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table 3: Second stage estimates for industry shocks
Panel A. Industry-level job change, using trade exposure ratios for trade impact indices
Net job Job creation Job destruction
change Total Continuers Entries Total Continuers Exits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ import impact index −1.01*** −0.40** −0.16*** −0.24* −0.61*** −0.13*** −0.48***(0.17) (0.16) (0.04) (0.13) (0.13) (0.03) (0.13)
∆ export impact index 0.62*** 0.36** 0.12*** 0.25* 0.26* 0.12*** 0.14
(0.13) (0.16) (0.03) (0.15) (0.14) (0.03) (0.14)
Panel B. Industry-level job change, using per-job trades for trade impact indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ import impact index −2.93*** −0.83 −0.41** −0.43 −2.10*** −0.47*** −1.63***(0.71) (0.55) (0.20) (0.45) (0.62) (0.11) (0.62)
∆ export impact index 1.17** 0.30 0.22* 0.08 0.86*** 0.20* 0.66**
(0.50) (0.38) (0.14) (0.29) (0.31) (0.11) (0.28)
Notes: Notes: N = 216. Kleibergen–Paap F statistic is 14.4 for Panel A, and 9.4 for Panel B. All estimations also include year
dummies, log wage per worker in 1995, and wage ratio to value added in 1995. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at an
indsutry level. Models are weighted by the number of jobs in industry at the start of period. First stage results are not reported,
because they are similar to Panel D in Table 2. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Second stage estimates by establishment-size group
Panel A. Industry-level job change, using trade exposure ratios for trade impact indices
1-24 jobs 25-99 jobs 100 or more jobs
Creation Destruction Creation Destruction Creation Destruction
Cont. Entries Cont. Exits Cont. Entries Cont. Exits Cont. Entries Cont. Exits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆ import impact index −0.05*** −0.08 0.03 −0.09 −0.07*** −0.15*** 0.03 −0.02 −0.04 −0.01 −0.19*** −0.37*(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.17) (0.06) (0.21)
∆ export impact index 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.01 0.00 0.07** 0.17 0.11*** 0.13
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.17) (0.04) (0.19)
Panel B. Industry-level job change, using per-job trades for trade impact indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆ import impact index −0.20*** −0.34* 0.18 0.00 −0.22*** −0.46*** 0.18** 0.04 0.01 0.37 −0.83*** −1.67**(0.07) (0.19) (0.14) (0.37) (0.05) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.22) (0.59) (0.20) (0.81)
∆ export impact index −0.00 0.04 −0.02 −0.09 0.08* 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.15 −0.04 0.19 0.72*
(0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.17) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.13) (0.34) (0.13) (0.37)
Notes: See notes on Table 3.
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Each category in Table 3 can be defined in each establishment-size group. I define estab-
lishments’ size from their number of jobs at the beginning year of each 10-year period, except
for entries, whose number of jobs is at the end of 10-year period. There are three categories of
establishment size: 1–24 jobs, 25–99 jobs, and 100 or more jobs. Second-stage estimators by
establishment-size subgroup are reported in Table 4. It clearly shows how import shocks and ex-
port shocks affect smaller establishments and larger establishments differently, which is also a new
finding of this study and is summarized as follows. Imports from Asia aggravate job destruction
of larger establishments with 100 or more jobs by promoting job destruction or by driving them to
exit, whereas they reduce job creation of smaller establishments with less than 100 jobs by con-
straining job creation or by hindering new establishments’ entry. One probable explanation is the
difference of strategies to cope with strengthening import competition between larger and smaller
establishments. On one hand, larger establishments actively decrease their size or totally close
under firms’ restructuring plans. It often becomes so salient that it ferments peoples’ backdrop
sentiments against imports. On the other hand, smaller establishments passively cocoon them-
selves and do not fill job attrition or cancel launching into business. Export has opposite effects,
i.e., exports alleviate job destruction in larger establishments and promote job creation in smaller
establishments. Exports also promote large establishments’ job creation. This indicates that the
benefit of exports is not confined to exporters themselves, most of them being large establishments.
Rather, this positive effect permeates smaller establishments.
4.3 Robustness check
I conducted six sets of robustness checks for total job creation and destruction in a conservative
approach. Trade impact indices used here are constructed from trade exposure ratios. Table 5
summarizes the results.26 Results for job creation correspond to Column 2 of Panel A in Table 3,
and results for job destruction correspond to Column 5 of the same panel.
26The results of robustness check in the case of per-job trades for trade impact indices are summarized in Appendix
Table A1. They are not systematically different from Panel B of Table 3.
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Table 5: Robustness check in the case of trade impact indices using trade exposure ratios
Panel A. Second-stage estimates for industry shocks
I. 5-year II. 2IV III. Import IV. Ratio to V. Excluding Tokyo VI. Excluding Tokyo,
periods from China domestic supply Nagoya, & Osaka
Job Job Job Job Job Job Job Job Job Job Job Job
creation destruction creation destruction creation destruction creation destruction creation destruction creation destruction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆ import impact index
−0.23 −0.72*** −0.38** −0.62*** −0.57*** −0.69*** −0.38 −0.69*** −0.38** −0.62*** −0.36** −0.63***
(0.20) (0.21) (0.16) (0.13) (0.18) (0.12) (0.23) (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15)
∆ export impact index
0.11 0.32** 0.21* 0.37*** 0.36** 0.20 0.30* 0.20 0.34** 0.27* 0.24* 0.29*
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16)
No. of observations 432 216 216 216 216 216
Kleibergen–Paap F statistic 1.1 1.2 13.9 15.1 18.9 16.2
Panel B. First-stage estimates for industry shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dep. variable: ∆ import impact index
∆ Asian export index × 100 4.38*** 4.47*** 4.05*** 4.33*** 4.33***
(0.52) (0.62) (0.73) (0.60) (0.59)
∆ European export index × 100 −0.30 0.19 0.76 −0.11 0.01
(0.37) (0.48) (0.54) (0.44) (0.49)
∆ N.A. export index × 100 −0.33 −1.15 −0.69 −1.22 −1.23
(0.36) (0.84) (0.92) (0.91) (1.07)
∆ European & North American −0.40
export index × 100 (0.47)
∆ Chinese export index × 100 6.28***
(0.96)
R2 0.67 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.76 0.76
F statistic of excl. instruments 58 47 31 40 39 39
Dep. variable: ∆ export impact index
∆ Asian export index × 100 1.24 0.03 0.48 −0.34 −0.42
(1.26) (0.83) (1.27) (0.78) (0.78)
∆ European export index × 100 2.52 3.70*** 3.33*** 3.40*** 3.64***
(1.59) (1.13) (1.09) (1.11) (1.18)
∆ N.A. export index × 100 0.27 −1.62 −1.62 −1.68 −1.42
(0.86) (2.16) (2.06) (1.95) (2.35)
∆ European & North American 2.22
export index × 100 (1.50)
∆ Chinese export index × 100 −1.44
(0.99)
R2 0.33 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43
F statistic of excl. instruments 8 11 17 23 25 23
Notes: See notes on Table 3.
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The first and second cases change part of estimation specification from the baseline. Columns
1 and 2 show the results of job creation and destruction using 5-year period data.27 Compared
to results using 10-year period data, estimators for job creation become statistically insignificant.
However, because any IV for export impact index at the first-stage estimation does not have a
statistically significant coefficient and Kleibergen–Paap F statistic at the second-stage estimation
is very small, it is difficult to obtain some interpretation whether quinquenial and decadal job
changes are quantitatively different. Columns 3 and 4 are the results when exports from Europe
and North America are combined into one variable and use two IV in the first-stage estimation.
Second-stage results are similar to the base results, but a newly created IV fails to explain Japanese
exports and Kleibergen–Paap F statistic at the second-stage estimation is very small. These results
support the appropriateness of estimation specification for the baseline results.
The third and fourth cases incorporate variables used by most of the previous studies on the
“China shock.” Columns 5 and 6 report the results when Japanese imports from China are used
instead of imports from Asia to examine whether they have different impact on the Japanese labor
market. IV for imports from China is Chinese exports to the world except for those to Japan, being
defined in a similar way as IV for imports from Asia. Although the two estimators of import impact
index for job creation (−0.57) and for job destruction (−0.69) are larger in absolute terms than the
baseline case, the difference is not as meaningful. It is safe to say that imports from China and
Asia have similar effects on Japanese jobs. Columns 7 and 8 indicate the results when the import
impact index is obtained from dividing dmi not by industry i’s domestic output but by industry
i’s domestic supply, i.e., domestic output plus imports minus exports. This denominator is used
in previous research, including Autor et al. (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016). The definition of
the export impact index has not changed. The second-stage results are similar to those in Panel
27The correspondence of 5-year periods for job change and those for trade change is as follows. Job changes from
1996 to 2001 and from 2001 to 2006 correspond to trade-value changes from 1996 to 2001 and from 2001 to 2006. The
interval of evaluating job change from 2006 to 2012 was actually 64 months, respectively. Thus, the corresponding
change of annual trade is obtained by multiplying trade change between 2006 and 2011 by 1615 . Additionally, the
interval of evaluating job change from 2012 to 2016 is 52 months. Thus, the corresponding trade change is from
multiplying trade change from 2011 to 2015 by 1312 .
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A of Table 3, although their statistical significance decreases. In this study, the results are robust
regardless of the definition of import partners and an import index.
The fifth and sixth cases exclude dominant metropolitan areas. The distributions of not only
the population but also manufacturing jobs are concentrated in particular areas. Among the total
of 12.5 million manufacturing jobs in 1996, Tokyo—the capital of Japan—has 3.0 million jobs,
which represents more than one-quarter of total manufacturing jobs. Moreover, three large cities
(Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya) have 5.0 million total jobs, accounting for 40 percent of the national
manufacturing jobs. Readers may wonder how the most populous metropolitan areas affect the
results of weighted regressions. Columns 9 and 10 present the results when Tokyo is excluded
from the dataset, and Columns 11 and 12 are the results when all three large cities are excluded.
These results are minimally different from those in Panel A of Table 2, indicating that the main
results are derived not only from particular large cities but rather nationwide.
5 Implied job changes due to trade shocks
The implied job creation and destruction induced by changes in trade that affected the indices be-
tween 1996 and 2016 are drawn in Panel A of Figure 6. Implied job changes are obtained by using
estimators in Columns 2 and 5 in Panel A of Figure 3 when trade impact indices are based on trade
exposure ratios, whereas they are obtained using those in Panel B when trade impact indices are
based on per-job trades.28 Because the estimators in Table 3 are obtained from the regression in
which a dependent variable is industry-level shocks obtained from the Amiti-Weinstein decom-
28Take the leftmost bar in Panel A—the implied number of jobs hindered from being created because of imports
from Asia when the import impact index is based on trade exposure ratios—as an example to explain how to obtain the
number. The estimator of the import impact index for total job creation is −0.40. The import impact index increased
by 9.10 million JPY at 2005 value from 1996 to 2006 (reported in Table 1), and the number of manufacturing jobs in
Japan in 1996 was 12,458,000. The implied number of jobs hindered to create by strengthening import competition
from 1996 to 2006 was −0.40×9.10×12,458,000100 = −453,000. Similarly, import impact index increased by 6.53 million
JPY at 2005 value from 2006 to 2016, and the number of manufacturing jobs in 2006 was 10,116,000, therefore the
corresponding figure from 2006 to 2016 was −264,000 (= −0.40×6.53×10,116,000100 ). The sum of these figures, 718,000,
is represented by the leftmost bar in Panel A.
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Figure 6: Implied job changes induces by trade shocks: 1996–2016
position, I call the implied job changes in Panel A conservative. Panel A shows that implied job
creations induced by import and export shocks are both larger in absolute values in the case of
trade exposure ratios than those in the case of per-job trades. Implied job destructions by import
and export shocks are also larger in the case of trade exposure ratios. The total effect is the sum of
the import and export effects. Although the trade impact on job creation and destruction is larger in
the case of trade exposure ratios, this does not mean that the total effect is also larger in this case.
Actually, the total trade effect on job creation is almost nonexistent in the case of trade exposure
ratios.
As explained in Subsection 4.1, I chose a conservative method to exclude regional factors from
job changes and used industry-level job changes as the unit of analysis to estimate trade shocks on
job changes. It is useful to compare here the results with the ones obtained from the widely-used
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methodology of Autor et al. (2013) for indicating the characteristics of the present conservative
analysis. Autor et al. (2013) used region-level job changes as a dependent variable and some
region-level variables as independent variable, including regional trade shocks summarized by the
shift-share instrument. As their dependent variable, decadal changes in the manufacturing employ-
ment share of the working-age population in each region in percentage points, covers both region-
and industry-shocks, I call their approach as a liberal one, acknowledging that they controlled
regional factors by using region-level variables. Taniguchi (2019) applied their methodology for
Japanese manufacturing employment.
Table 6 summarizes the estimation results of liberal specifications obtained from the Japanese
dataset. Column 1 reflects when trade impact indices are obtained from trade exposure ratios,
whereas Column 2 reflects when they are from per-job trades. Note that trade impact indices used
for Table 6 include both direct and upstream impacts, the definition of which is different from Autor
et al. (2013). Independent variables include not only trade impact indices but also the percentage of
manufacturing jobs to total regional jobs, the percentage of jobs for women to total regional jobs,
and high-order region × year dummies, following Autor et al. (2013) and Dauth et al. (2014). The
estimators of import and export in Column 2 are much smaller than the corresponding estimators
obtained in these previous studies.29
Panel B of Figure 6 depicts the implied net job changes for two decades due to the change of
trade impact indices, calculated from Table 3 (conservative) and Table 6 (liberal). Generally, liberal
estimations reports larger figures in absolute terms than conservative estimations of the decrease
29Estimator−0.88 of import impact from Asia implies that a 1-million-JPY (in 2005) per worker increase in import
impact index from Asia over a decade reduced the manufacturing employment share of the working-age population by
0.88 percent point. Using an exchange rate of JPY 117.75 per USD in 2007 and a decrease of Japanese GDP deflator
of 1.69 percent from 2005 to 2007, this estimator was converted to −0.105 in Autor et al. (2013), where the estimator
of imports from China in Column 6 of Table 3 was −0.596. Though import impact index includes upstream effect,
which prevents direct comparison, it is safe to say that the estimator in Table 6 is smaller than the outcome of Autor
et al. (2013). Additionally, using an exchange rate of JPY 137.07 per Euro in 2005, this estimator converts to −0.121
in Dauth et al. (2014), in which the estimator of imports from China and Eastern Europe in Column 5 of Table 1
is −0.190. Estimator 0.35 of export impact to the world is equivalent to 0.048 in Dauth et al. (2014), in which the
estimator of exports in the same Column is 0.399.
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Table 6: 2SLS estimates for regional changes of manufacturing job ratios
(1) (2)
Trade Per-job
Trade variable: exposure trades
ratios
Second stage estimates
Dep. variable: ∆ manufacturing job ratios
∆ import impact index −0.18*** −0.88***(0.05) (0.29)
∆ export impact index 0.09*** 0.35***(0.03) (0.08)
Kleibergen–Paap F statistic 29.6 101.0
First stage estimates
Dep. variable: ∆ import impact index
∆ Asian export index × 100 4.21*** 4.13***(0.21) (0.23)
∆ European export index × 100 0.65** 0.31(0.29) (0.23)
∆ N.A. export index × 100 0.82 0.60(0.57) (0.54)
R2 0.81 0.61
F statistic of excl. instruments 192 109
Dep. variable: ∆ export impact index
∆ Asian export index × 100 −2.43*** −2.32***(0.40) (0.52)
∆ European export index × 100 7.04*** 11.46***(0.94) (1.07)
∆ N.A. export index × 100 0.82 4.32***(1.44) (1.30)
R2 0.90 0.93
F statistic of excl. instruments 452 398
Notes: N = 456. All estimations also include the percentage of
manufacturing jobs to total regional jobs, the percentage of jobs
for women to total regional jobs, and high-order region × year
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at a region
level. Models are weighted by the number of jobs in region at the
start of period. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
in jobs by imports and the increase of jobs by exports. Interestingly, the that total trade effect on
net job decreases in a liberal estimation is twice as much as that in a conservative estimation in
both cases of trade impact indices. When using trade exposure ratios in a conservative estimation,
imports cause a decrease of 1,812,000 jobs and exports cause an increase of 1,268,000. Therefore,
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the total number of jobs decreased by 544,000. In the case of using per-job trades in a conservative
estimation, both imports and exports have less of an impact, but the calculated number of decreased
jobs is a similar figure: 429,000. In a liberal estimation, the calculated total loss of manufacturing
jobs as the sum of import and export effects is approximately 1 million in both cases of trade
impact indices. A conservative estimation reports the number of disappeared jobs by trades at
approximately half of a liberal estimation. This result may represent the fact that the region-level
analysis using the methodology of Autor et al. (2013) cannot fully absorb regional factors through
region-level variables.30
From 1996 to 2016, actual manufacturing jobs in Japan decreased by 3,711,000, meaning that
the trade impact accounted for 12–15 percent of the total job decrease for a conservative estimation
and 27–28 percent for a liberal estimation. The aspects of job creation and destruction explainable
by trade shocks are much smaller. For example, some manufacturing establishments increased
jobs by 3,616,000 from 1996 to 2006. During the same period, total trade shocks accelerated job
creation by 223,000, based on conservative estimations using trade exposure ratios. That figure
represents as little as 6 percent of the actual job creation. Similarly, other establishments decreased
jobs by 5,900,000 during the same period, whereas implied job destruction from trade shocks was
203,000, about 3 percent of the actual changes. These findings imply that the trade impact on job
dynamism is actually more limited than it appears like from its impact on net job changes.31
Lastly, Panels C and D summarize total trade effect on net job changes by the establishment-
size group from 1996 to 2016. These figures are calculated from the results in Panels A and B of
Table 4: 12 bars from the left to right in Panels C and D correspond to Columns 1–12 in Panels A
and B of Table 4, respectively. For example, the leftmost bar in Panel C is the sum of the implied
30If the total change in imports over time can further be decomposed into the part caused by exogenous supply
shocks and a residual part, including domestic demand shifts, as Autor et al. (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) did,
lesser negative import effects from exogenous supply shocks on jobs would be obtained. However, the methods that
these studies used to distinguish these two parts are applicable to the case of one IV. As this study contains three IV,
their methods cannot be directly used. Therefore, I use numbers in Figure 6 and Appendix Table A2 as my results,
noticing the possibility that the implied number of job changes due to trade shocks is overestimated.
31Detailed figures about implied job changes for each 10-year period are reported in Appendix Table A2.
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change in jobs created by continuing establishments with 1–24 jobs given total import and export
shocks when using trade exposure ratios for trade impact indices. This figure is negative, meaning
that job creation by establishments with 1–24 jobs and surviving for 10 years was discouraged by
net trade shocks for two decades. Panels C and D show noticeable differences in job creation by
entries of and in job destruction by exits of establishments with 100 or more jobs, in which Panel
C reports a more significant impact.
Regarding the signs of the trade impact on job changes, larger establishments with 100 or more
jobs and smaller establishments with less than 100 jobs are starkly different. Larger establishments
have positive implied job changes for two job creation categories (by continuers and by entries) and
negative implied job changes for two job destruction categories (by continuers and by exits). This
finding indicates that trade shocks expand a swing of job reallocation in larger establishments: the
sum of import and export effects accelerates both job creation and destruction. In general, smaller
establishments have opposite signs. That is, the sum of the trade shocks decelerates both job
creation and destruction. In Subsection 4.2, I explained that the difference is probably generated
from establishments’ strategies to cope with trade shocks. Using that argument, I summarize that
larger establishments actively hire and fire workers and start and stop their businesses, whereas
smaller establishments take a passive approach for adjusting their business sizes.
The sum of the import and export shocks has different effects on job reallocation between larger
and smaller establishments, which has important implications for the social costs of international
trade. Although net job change—the sum of four job reallocation categories—is negative in all
three establishment-size groups in Panels C and D, trade shocks accelerate both job creation and
destruction in large establishments; therefore, the number of jobs reallocated surpasses the number
of jobs decreased. Trade shocks induce more job destruction in larger establishments, forcing
the dismissal of some workers. These dismissed workers could later obtain newly created jobs, but
many of them experience some trouble that accompanies switching careers, such as job relocations,
being between jobs, and wage decreases. Therefore, workers in larger establishments are more




This study enlarged the investigation scope regarding the job effect of international trade as it
encompasses not only the impact on net job change but also on job reallocation. Whereas previous
studies observed that strengthening import competition reduced manufacturing jobs, they did not
investigate how net job loss was produced through job creation and job destruction by the response
of establishments. This study decomposed manufacturing job changes into industry, regional,
and common shocks to elucidate the difference of trade impacts on job reallocation through these
shocks. As it is found that trade shocks did not have statistically significant effect on regional
shocks, I estimated the impact of trade shocks on the number of jobs through industry shocks in
cross-industry specification as a conservative approach. The panel data of Japanese manufacturing
establishments from 1996 to 2016 are used.
The present study revealed that trade shocks affect job changes differently between continuing
establishments and entries and exits, and between smaller and larger establishments. First, trade
shocks change the number of jobs through establishments’ extensive margin than through their in-
tensive margin. This finding underlines the importance of establishments’ entry and exit as related
to job churning. Second, trade shocks affect job creation in smaller establishments and job de-
struction in larger establishments in a statistically significant manner. Imports reduce job creation
and exports promote it in smaller establishments, whereas imports aggravate job destruction and
exports alleviate it in larger establishments, based on the difference in establishments’ responses
to trade shocks. These facts become observable by using establishment-level panel data.
Observed trade effects on net job change and job reallocation are as follows. First, implied
job changes attributable to trade shocks accounted for 12–15 percent of total manufacturing job
decreases in Japan from 1996 to 2016. This figure is approximately half that obtained from a
widely used region-level analysis. Second, trade shocks accelerate job reallocation in larger es-
tablishments, whereas they decelerate job reallocation in smaller establishments. These results
corroborate the findings of recent studies about the wide aspect of significant economic and so-
cial costs of import shocks by indicating that workers in larger establishments are more prone to
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suffer unpleasant factors accompanying with job reallocation and to decrease their quality of life
because of trade shocks. Future study would reveal how trade shocks affect job reallocation more
profoundly for the better understanding of trade impact on our working status and our welfare.
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Appendix Tables
Table A1: Robustness check in the case of trade impact indices using per-job trades
Panel A. Second-stage estimates for industry shocks
I. 5-year II. 2IV III. Import IV. Excluding Tokyo V. Excluding Tokyo,
period from China Nagoya, & Osaka
Job Job Job Job Job Job Job Job Job Job
creation destruction creation destruction creation destruction creation destruction creation destruction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆ import impact index
−0.29 −2.46*** −0.80 −2.11*** −1.43** −2.38*** −0.68 −2.35*** −0.64 −2.42***
(0.64) (0.59) (0.54) (0.62) (0.67) (0.69) (0.65) (0.74) (0.71) (0.69)
∆ export impact index
−0.06 0.83*** 0.20 0.92*** 0.18 0.55** 0.33 0.92*** 0.24 0.94***
(0.32) (0.30) (0.34) (0.31) (0.37) (0.27) (0.41) (0.34) (0.38) (0.34)
No. of observations 432 216 216 216 216
Kleibergen–Paap F statistic 5.2 12.9 12.9 9.5 9.9
Panel B. First-stage estimates for industry shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. variable: ∆ import impact index
∆ Asian export index × 100 4.45*** 4.64*** 4.53*** 4.49***
(0.37) (0.79) (0.75) (0.74)
∆ European export index × 100 0.11 0.79 0.10 0.20
(0.57) (0.59) (0.56) (0.59)
∆ N.A. export index × 100 0.15 0.75 0.15 0.29
(0.42) (0.75) (0.45) (0.49)
∆ European & North American 0.08
export index × 100 (0.55)
∆ Chinese export index × 100 6.90***
(1.26)
R2 0.64 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.70
F statistic of excl. instruments 92 100 60 81 85
Dep. variable: ∆ export impact index
∆ Asian export index × 100 0.29 −1.45 −1.37 −1.57*
(1.21) (0.99) (0.94) (0.91)
∆ European export index × 100 8.69*** 7.91*** 7.91*** 8.23***
(2.12) (1.45) (1.57) (1.56)
∆ N.A. export index × 100 1.67 4.60*** 4.13*** 4.88***
(1.67) (1.62) (1.53) (1.69)
∆ European & North American 7.48***
export index × 100 (1.52)
∆ Chinese export index × 100 −3.39***
(1.28)
R2 0.54 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.63
F statistic of excl. instruments 10 11 13 21 14
Notes: See notes on Table 3.
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Table A2: Estimated number of jobs affected by trade shocks
Panel A. Actual numbers
1996-2006 2006-2016 Total
Net job change −2,283 −1,428 −3,711
Job creation 3,616 3,430 7,047
Job destruction −5,900 −4,858 −10,758
Panel B. Implied job changes induced by changes in trade impact indices
1996-2006 2006-2016 Total
Case I. Conservative estimation, using trade exposure ratios
Effect of imports from Asia
Net job change −1,145 −667 −1,812
Job creation −453 −264 −718
Job destruction −692 −403 −1,095
Effect of exports to the world
Net job change 1,165 103 1,268
Job creation 676 60 736
Job destruction 488 43 532
Total trade effect
Net job change 20 −564 −544
Job creation 223 −204 19
Job destruction −203 −360 −563
Case II. Conservative estimation, using per-job trades
Effect of imports from Asia
Net job change −555 −430 −985
Job creation −157 −122 −279
Job destruction −398 −308 −706
Effect of exports to the world
Net job change 553 2 556
Job creation 143 1 144
Job destruction 410 2 412
Total trade effect
Net job change −1 −427 −429
Job creation −14 −121 −135
Job destruction 13 −306 −294
Case III. Liberal estimation, using trade exposure ratios
Net job change
Effect of imports from Asia −1,323 −887 −2,209
Effect of exports to the world 1,052 112 1,164
Total trade effect −271 −775 −1,046
Case IV. Liberal estimation, using per-job trades
Net job change
Effect of imports from Asia −1,071 −959 −2,030
Effect of exports to the world 1,025 4 1,029
Total trade effect −46 −956 −1,001
Notes: The method of calculation is explained in the main text. Units are thousand.
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